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STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN DUAL PTAB 
AND DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan† 
The post-grant review proceedings set up at the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office’s Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) by the America Invents Act of 2011 
have transformed the relationship between Article III patent litigation and the 
administrative state. Not surprisingly, such dramatic change has itself yielded 
additional litigation possibilities: Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, a case 
addressing divergence between the manner in which the PTAB and Article III 
courts construe patent claims, will soon be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Of the three major new PTAB proceedings, two have proven to be popular as 
well as controversial: inter partes review and covered business method review. Yet 
scholarly analysis of litigant behavior in these proceedings has been limited thus 
far to descriptive data summaries or specific policy perspectives on these types of 
post-grant challenges, such as their impact on the well-rehearsed patent troll 
debate. In this article, we present what is to our knowledge the first comprehensive 
empirical and analytical study of how litigants use these inter partes review and 
covered business method review proceedings relative to Article III litigation. 
A major normative argument for administrative ex post review is that it should 
be an efficient, accessible, and accurate substitute for Article III litigation over 
patent validity. We assess the substitution hypothesis, using individual patents as 
our general unit of analysis as well as investigating patent-petitioner pairs and 
similar details in greater depth. Our data indicate that the “standard model” of 
explicit substitution—wherein a district court defendant subsequently brings an 
administrative challenge to patent validity—occurs for the majority (70%) of 
petitioners who bring inter partes review challenges. An important implication of 
this effect is that the PTAB should use a claim construction standard that mirrors 
that of the district court.  With a uniform standard, PTAB claim constructions 
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could be used by district courts in any subsequent proceedings, and the benefits of 
substituting administrative process for judicial process would thereby be most 
fully realized. 
Notably, however, standard substitution is not the only use of the PTAB: 
particularly in the area of inter partes reviews, we also see a surprising percentage 
of cases (about 30%) where the petitioner is not the target of a prior suit on the 
same patent. The frequency of these nonstandard petitioners, as well as their 
tendency to join the same petitions as an entity that has been sued, varies by 
technology. Our data on nonstandard petitioners provide some insight into the 
extent to which patent challengers are engaging in collective action to contest the 
validity of patents. Depending on the details of how nonstandard petitioning and 
collective action are being deployed, this activity could provide a social benefit or 
constitute a form of harassment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This is the first paper in a multipart project studying the new 
post-grant review proceedings set up at the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) 
by the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).1 These new administrative 
trial-type proceedings represent a significant change in the 
relationship between the system of patent litigation in Article III 
courts and the administrative state.  One case involving this 
relationship, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,2 is already 
before the U.S. Supreme Court and others are in the pipeline. 
Although PTAB proceedings have proved to be quite popular, 
scholarly analysis of litigant behavior has thus far been limited to 
descriptive data summaries or specific policy perspectives on post-
grant challenges, such as their impact on the well-rehearsed patent 
troll debate.3 This Article is the first comprehensive empirical and 
analytical study of how litigants use these administrative procedures 
relative to Article III litigation. In addition to assessing the behavior 
of litigants, we analyze the behavior of both the PTAB and the courts. 
Under the AIA, defendants, potential defendants, and third 
parties now confront the question of whether and when to challenge 
the validity of patents by filing one or more petitions for inter partes 
review (IPR) or, if applicable, petitions for covered business method 
(CBM) review. IPR petitions are filed against individual patents (and 
claims thereof), but multiple petitions against a patent may be filed 
by the same or different parties, and a single petition may be filed or 
joined by multiple parties. Similarly, CBM petitions are filed against 
individual patents and claims that are directed to eligible business 
method-related inventions.4 
Meanwhile, patent owners still face the question of which patents 
to assert, when and where to assert them, and against whom to assert 
them. The AIA’s anti-joinder provision for Article III litigation 
 
 1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284. 
 2. No. 15-446. 
 3. E.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early 
Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014). 
 4. In ongoing work, discussed in summary below, we are looking in detail at 
patents that are the subject of more than one petition. We are dividing these 
patents into two categories: those that are challenged by the same petitioner 
multiple times, and those that are challenged by different petitioners. We are 
further subdividing the two categories by claims and grounds. 
RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2016  3:16 PM 
48 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:1  
arguably increases complexity by substantially reducing owners’ 
ability to sue multiple defendants in a single case.5 Thus, patent 
owners wishing to sue multiple defendants on a given patent 
generally have to sue them individually. More importantly for our 
purposes, the rise of the PTAB forces patent owners to factor in the 
strong possibility of retaliatory or even preemptive patent validity 
challenges at the PTAB. As a result, two complex frameworks of 
resolving patent disputes now coexist: ordinary infringement 
litigation and declaratory judgment actions in Article III courts, 
along with administrative invalidation actions in the PTAB. 
Multiple proceedings with many potential parties offer a number 
of strategic possibilities. Two examples of ongoing litigation 
involving certain highly asserted and highly petitioned patents 
provide an illustration of the complexities and the correspondingly 
complicated strategic questions. Although these cases are hardly 
representative, they do provide clear examples of the multiple, 
perhaps even combinatorial, strategic possibilities. 
In a set of seven cases filed between July 1 and July 9, 2013, Zond, 
a plasma discharge technology developer, asserted a suite of patents 
in Massachusetts district court against nine defendants.6 Intel, one 
of the defendants, responded by filing IPR petitions on all of the 
asserted patents.7 In April 2014, Intel persuaded the Massachusetts 
district court to grant a stay of the litigation.8 Within two months of 
the court granting a stay to Intel, all but one of the defendants had 
filed IPR petitions on the same claims and the same grounds.9 All of 
the petitioning defendants received stays, and the PTAB joined them 
to the Intel petitions. Although Intel ultimately settled, PTAB review 
 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 299. See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 652 (2013) (discussing rationale for anti-joinder provision). 
 6. Zond, Inc. v. Gillette Co., No. 1-13-cv-11567 (D. Mass., July 1, 2013); Zond, 
LLC v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11577 (D. Mass., July 2, 2013); 
Zond, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 1-13-cv-11570 (D. Mass., July 2, 2013); Zond, Inc. v. 
SK Hynix Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11591 (D. Mass., July 3, 2013); Zond, Inc. v. Toshiba 
America Elec. Components, Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11581 (D. Mass., July 3, 2013); Zond, 
Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Corp., No. 1-13-cv-11625 (D. Mass., July 8, 2013); Zond, Inc. 
v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1-13-cv-11634 (D. Mass., July 9, 2013). 
 7. The 27 inter partes review petitions filed by Intel are listed in Table 1 of 
Appendix C. 
 8. Order Granting Motion to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review, Case No. 1-
13-cv-11570, Paper No. 120 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2014).  
 9. The 90 inter partes review petitions filed by defendants are listed in Table 
2 of Appendix C. 
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of the challenged patents continues, albeit with a new lead 
petitioner.10 
In another set of cases, e-Watch sued eleven firms on two digital 
signal transmission patents in the Eastern District of Texas.11 A third-
party firm filed the first PTAB petition related to those patents.12 
Subsequently, HTC, a defendant, instituted a petition, and the 
institution of the HTC petition triggered other petitions.13 
A major normative argument for administrative ex post review is 
that it should be an efficient, accessible, and accurate substitute for 
Article III litigation over patent validity.14 In this paper, we assess the 
substitution hypothesis, using individual patents as our basic unit of 
analysis and also investigating patent-petitioner pairs and similar 
details in greater depth. Our data indicate that the “standard model” 
of substitution—wherein a district court defendant subsequently 
brings an administrative challenge to patent validity—is indeed 
occurring. The majority (about 70 percent) of petitioners who bring 
inter partes review challenges fit the standard model.  In fact, our 
data indicate that both explicit substitution and potential settlement 
in the shadow of an IPR challenge might be occurring.  This 
substitution effect would suggest that the PTAB should use a claim 
 
 10. Joint motions to terminate proceedings, all filed simultaneously on Sept. 
12, 2014, settled the Intel-initiated IPR petitions on Zond’s patents. The settlement 
agreement between Intel and Zond that governs the termination of all these 
proceedings is confidential. 
 11. e-Watch, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2-13-cv-01064 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 
2013); e-Watch, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2-13-cv-01062 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 
2013); e-Watch, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2-13-cv-01061 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); e-
Watch, Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01063 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); e-Watch 
Inc. v. BlackBerry Ltd., No. 2-13-cv-01078 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. 
v. Sharp Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01074 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. ZTE 
Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01071 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Sony Corp., 
No. 2-13-cv-01073 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. 2-
13-cv-01075 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Huawei Tech. Co., No. 2-
13-cv-01076 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Kyocera Commc’ns, Inc., 
No. 2-13-cv-01077 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013). 
 12. Petition for Inter Partes Review by Iron Dome LLC, No. IPR2014-00439 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2014). 
 13. The twelve inter partes review petitions filed are listed in Table 3 of 
Appendix C. 
 14. Others (including one of us) have argued that to the extent the procedures 
set up by the AIA resemble formal adjudications, they could serve as a vehicle not 
simply for error correction but also for legal and policy development. See, e.g., Arti 
K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for 
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The 
Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1959 (2013). In this Article, however, we focus on error correction. 
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construction standard that mirrors that of district courts.  With a 
uniform standard, PTAB claim constructions could be used by 
district courts in any subsequent proceedings, and the benefits of 
substituting administrative process for judicial process would 
thereby be most fully realized.  
Notably, however, standard substitution is not the only use of the 
PTAB: particularly in the area of IPRs, we also see a surprising 
percentage of cases (about 30 percent) where the petitioner is not the 
target of a prior suit on the same patent. The frequency of these 
nonstandard petitioners, as well as their tendency to join the same 
petitions as an entity that has been sued, varies by technology. Our 
data on nonstandard petitioners thus provide some insight into the 
extent patent challengers are engaging in collective action to 
challenge patents. 
Depending on the details of how nonstandard petitioning and 
collective action are being deployed, this activity could provide a 
social benefit or constitute a form of harassment. As we discuss in 
Part II, many commentators have noted that challenging an invalid 
patent, particularly in expensive Article III litigation, represents a 
collective action problem. Administrative alternatives may ease the 
collective action problem, but they may also provide opportunities 
for harassing patent owners.15 As another indicator of potential 
harassment and delay, we also look at the frequency of serial 
petitioning on a given patent. 
Of course, substitution of any sort (as contrasted with 
duplication) can occur only if administrative review is accurate and 
efficient, and courts generally stay any related Article III litigation 
pending administrative review. In the case of declaratory judgment 
(DJ) litigation, the AIA both bars a DJ litigant from bringing a 
subsequent administrative review and provides for automatic stays 
of any subsequent DJ actions.16 So the issue of duplication primarily 
arises in the context of infringement litigation brought by the patent 
owner. Although a full answer to the duplication issue awaits further 
 
 15. E.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881 (2015); 
Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH L.J. 145, 165 (2002) (discussing the dangers of delay and harassment in post-
issuance patent office proceedings); Raymond A. Mercado, Ensuring the Integrity 
of Administrative Challenges to Patents: Lessons from Reexamination, 14 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 558 (2013). 
 16. Perhaps not surprisingly, since patents became available for PTAB review, 
DJ actions have fallen both in absolute terms and as a percentage of case filings. 
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decision making in cases currently before the PTAB and the courts, 
we provide some initial data on the question.  
In this Article, Part II discusses the normative arguments for and 
against administrative ex post validity review as a substitute for 
judicial review. It reviews these arguments as they developed in 
earlier incarnations of administrative review and as they developed 
in the far more robust AIA proceedings. Part III provides the large-
scale empirical data we have gathered. It discusses various indicia of 
a general substitution effect in the context of particular technologies 
and in particular district courts. We also discuss the phenomenon of 
nonstandard petitioners and the collective action in which they 
sometimes engage. Additionally, Part III presents data regarding 
multiple IPR petitions filed against the same patent. Based on these 
data, Part III examines agency and court decision-making in the face 
of strategic behavior by the parties before them. Part IV discusses our 
major findings, suggests directions for further research, and outlines 
our ongoing agenda to advance these research goals. 
I. EX POST REVIEW OF PATENT VALIDITY 
This Part discusses the normative arguments that have motivated 
administrative review of patent validity, particularly as a substitute 
for litigation in the federal courts. Against the backdrop of this 
normative framing, we then evaluate ex parte and inter partes 
reexamination (the latter now defunct) as well as the new ex post 
review procedures introduced by the AIA. 
A. MOTIVATIONS FOR (AND CONCERNS REGARDING) 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW  
The initial patent examination process will inevitably produce 
some improper patent grants. To the extent improperly granted 
patents impose unnecessary costs and call into question the 
credibility of the patent system,17 these improper grants ought to be 
 
 17. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a 
Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 7–36 (1997) (considering USPTO’s role in patent revocation via 
administrative reexamination). For purposes of this article, we need not engage 
the robust academic debate over the level of error the initial examination process 
should tolerate. 
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corrected.18 The importance of error correction remains a dominant 
theme in ex post patent review, especially in evaluating the success 
of the AIA.19 Perhaps even more important, however, is the recurring 
theme of institutional design: the USPTO’s examination errors 
should not merely be corrected, but should be corrected outside the 
federal courts. 
Several interrelated arguments counsel in favor of administrative 
review. Most obviously, Article III litigation is quite costly. The 
biennial economic survey of the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association indicates that even for the lowest-stakes category of 
patent lawsuits (in which less than $1 million was at risk), median 
litigation costs have risen from $650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in 
2013.20 And for the highest-stakes lawsuits (in which more than $25 
million was at risk), median litigation costs rose over the same time 
period from $4.5 million to $5.5 million.21 
The high cost of litigation would be less problematic if these great 
expenditures yielded great accuracy in judicial outcomes. As 
standard economic accounts of procedure note, the goal of procedure 
is the minimization of litigation costs and error costs.22 But decisions 
 
 18. Ex post review as a means for correcting USPTO examination errors has 
been a consistent theme in institutional discussions of patent quality. See, e.g., In 
re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Congress intended 
reexaminations to provide an important ‘quality check’ on patents that would allow 
the government to remove defective and erroneously granted patents.”); In re 
Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The 
reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the government . . . 
and if need be to remove patents that never should have been granted.”); Patlex 
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The legislative history 
of the reexamination statute makes clear that its purpose is to cure defects in 
administrative agency action with regard to particular patents and to remedy 
perceived shortcomings in the system by which patents are issued.”). 
 19. The degree to which the AIA ex post administrative review procedures are 
actually capturing and correcting ex ante examination errors is the focus of related 
large-scale empirical research relying on much of the same data as the present 
project. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, David L. Schwartz & Alan C. Marco, What Ex 
Post Review Has Revealed About Patents (forthcoming).  
 20. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013) 
[hereinafter AIPLA SURVEY 2013]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the 
Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (modeling the relationship 
between the design of legal rules and the likelihood of reaching accurate 
outcomes); Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of 
Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (modeling the relationship between the 
design of legal rules and the likelihood of imposing accurate monetary sanctions). 
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reached in Article III litigation may not be particularly accurate.23 
Because patent law often uses science-based proxies such as 
“ordinary skill in the art” to tackle relevant legal and policy goals, the 
subject matter of patent law can be highly complex as a scientific 
matter.24 And even if a case is not highly complex as a scientific 
matter, the manner in which factual findings interact with law and 
policy can be complex.25 With the possible exception of Federal 
Circuit judges, judges in the federal courts tend to be generalists who 
may not be equipped to tackle complex questions at the intersection 
of law, science, and policy.26 Moreover, district courts have to 
contend with juries, which may be even less equipped than federal 
judges to address complex questions of law and science.27 In 
 
 23. E.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of 
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) 
(finding high reversal rate for district court claim construction). See generally 
Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 637, 659 (2013) (offering a brief survey of scholarly proposals to improve 
judicial accuracy in patent adjudication). 
 24. For example, a patent may be challenged as being invalid because the 
invention that it claims was obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in light of the prior 
technical knowledge available to those in the field at the time of invention. 
Whether a claimed invention is obvious is a question of law reviewed de novo on 
appeal. But the legal determination is based on predicate findings of fact regarding 
the prior art and the level of skill in the art. These findings are supposed to be 
reviewed deferentially on appeal. See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (concerning review from PTO patent denial); see also Graham v. John 
Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (explaining factual findings made by district court are 
subject to clearly erroneous review). Meanwhile, the USPTO’s factual findings in 
granting a patent are presumed correct and must be rebutted by clear and 
convincing evidence in the courts. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 
(2011). See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068–
75 (2003) (discussing the technical complexity often involved in applying patent 
law’s fact-based standards). 
 25. For example, the practical probative value of factual findings toward 
obviousness analysis may vary by the inherent unpredictability of the given 
technology: whereas mechanical inventions operate in relatively predictable and 
well-understood ways, small technical changes may lead to dramatic and 
unexpected results in biochemistry. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 26. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4–6 (2010). 
 27. See Mark Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patent Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 1673, 1705 (2013) (noting that as far back as the 1950s, modern technology 
was already “judged too complex for a jury to understand, so it made no sense to 
give them the patent questions” where avoidable). 
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contrast, administrative patent judges have long been required to be 
“persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability.”28 
Empirical research bears out concerns about the capacity of 
judges to resolve patent disputes. The generalist background of most 
district judges has led many plaintiffs to seek out specific districts,29 
with the natural result being a certain amount of de facto 
specialization.30 A few districts see a disproportionate number of 
patent cases, and some have reputations as “rocket dockets” for 
resolving them quickly.31 Empirical evidence suggests that, among 
the subset of judges who preside over patent cases regularly, 
increased experience may produce more efficient and accurate case 
outcomes.32 Yet this private ordering toward certain districts only 
underscores the overall lack of expertise among district court 
judges.33 Moreover, some commentators have argued that aggressive 
attempts to specialize in patent disputes by judges whose districts are 
found outside traditional technology centers lead to overly plaintiff-
friendly procedures rather than accurate adjudication.34 
 
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (requiring that “administrative patent judges shall be persons 
of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”). 
 29. Commentators have long discussed forum shopping at both the appellate 
and district court level. E.g., Scott Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John H. Turner, The 
Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the 
Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (forum shopping prior to the creation 
of the Federal Circuit); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does 
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) (early 
discussion of forum shopping at district court level). 
 30. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency 
and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a 
Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 447 (2011) (showing in 
Table III that the distribution of how many cases judges hear is highly skewed such 
that most judges hear fewer than ten patent cases each whereas roughly the top 
fifth of high-volume judges hear over three-fifths of all patent cases). 
 31. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An 
Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 58 (2011). 
 32. Kesan & Ball, supra note 30, at 423–43. 
 33. This argument is particularly compelling when offered by judges 
themselves. See, e.g., Judge James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization: 
A View from the Trial Bench, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 425, 430–31 (2002); 
Judge James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in 
the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2007); The Hon. Ed 
Kinkeade, Point-Counterpoint: Two Judges’ Perspectives on Trial by Jury, 12 
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 497, 498 (2006). 
 34. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 631 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 
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Another reason to favor low-cost administrative review, rather 
than high-cost Article III review, is that patent plaintiffs and 
defendants have asymmetric incentives. Supreme Court case law 
builds into the patent doctrine asymmetric incentives to litigate. 
Under the law’s estoppel provisions, a challenger who successfully 
invalidates a patent provides a public good—the challenger benefits 
not only itself but also all other potential challengers.35 By contrast, 
the challenger who loses is uniquely estopped from challenging the 
patent again.36 
Although the public-good-type incentive may exist in the 
administrative context as well37 (and, indeed, exists in both pre-AIA 
and post-AIA inter partes proceedings as a consequence of the 
congressional decision to implement relatively strong statutory 
estoppel provisions), the significantly lower cost of the 
administrative proceeding presumably reduces its scale. In other 
words, although a challenger may still be reluctant to provide a 
public good, a public good that costs a few hundred thousand dollars 
is quite different from one that costs several million dollars. 
Moreover, the absence of a standing requirement in IPR proceedings 
 
(2010); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2016), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [http://perma.cc/
528U-TJS8]. 
 35. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 
(1971) (stating a patent invalidity finding creates nonmutual defensive collateral 
estoppel, so that a patent that is invalid as against one party is invalid as against 
the world); see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge 
and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and 
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 
(2004) (noting that, in addition to public good problem, disincentives to challenge 
may be created in certain situations involving oligopolistic competition between 
licensee that pay sales-based royalties to the patentee).  
 36. Interestingly, some practitioners have suggested that the pre-AIA 
tendency of so-called patent trolls to sue multiple defendants in one suit might 
have facilitated some collective action through informal or formal joint defense 
agreements. See Daniel Bream & Lee Cheng, Benefits of a Coordinated Joint 
Defense in Patent Cases, LAW360 (Nov. 27, 2012). Whether or not that was the 
case, the AIA’s anti-joinder provision may limit this potential nudge towards 
collective action. Id. 
 37. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent 
System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001). But see 
Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 323–27 (2007) 
(noting that administrative review that relied on Chevron deference by the courts 
rather than estoppel against the patent challenger could substantially reduce 
collective action problems). 
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creates possibilities for additional entities, including entities that 
represent groups of potential defendants in a given industry, to 
challenge patents. 
For these reasons, a less costly, more expert, and more widely 
accessible institution has long been thought desirable. On the other 
hand, even advocates of an administrative mechanism have noted 
the potential for harassment of patent owners that might arise in 
such administrative review.38 Harassment potential exists as the 
obvious flip side of access created by low cost and the absence of an 
Article III standing requirement.39 Moreover, to the extent that 
courts do not believe that administrative review will in fact be 
accurate and efficient, and thus do not stay any related Article III 
litigation, such review may create costly duplication rather than 
efficiency.  
B. OPPOSITION MECHANISMS PRIOR TO THE AIA 
In 1980 Congress created a mechanism for USPTO ex parte 
reexamination of patent validity,40 and in 1999 Congress created a 
mechanism for inter partes reexamination.41 These procedures have 
realized their error-correction and efficiency goals to varying degrees 
and have interacted in important ways with federal court litigation. 
1. Ex Parte Reexamination 
As the Federal Circuit recognized in a contemporaneous opinion, 
the ex parte reexamination system was an effort to reap 
three principal benefits. First, the new procedure could 
settle validity disputes more quickly and less expensively 
 
 38. E.g., Kesan, supra note 15 (noting the potential for delay and harassment 
in patent office proceedings); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 
522 (2011) (recognizing that “inter partes review could potentially be abused by 
parties interested only in delaying and harassing competitors”); Joe Matal, A 
Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. 
CIR. B.J. 539, 550 (2012) (noting that the AIA’s own statutory text directs the 
USPTO to penalize abuses of administrative validity challenge proceedings “such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost 
of the proceeding”). 
 39. That said, the challenger who loses at the administrative level may have to 
meet Article III standing requirements in order to appeal. See Consumer Watchdog 
v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 40. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). 
 41. American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 
(1999). 
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than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases. 
Second, the procedure would allow courts to refer patent 
validity questions to the expertise of the Patent Office. 
Third, reexamination would reinforce investor confidence 
in the certainty of patent rights by affording the USPTO a 
broader opportunity to review doubtful patents.42 
The parameters of this reexamination procedure reflect its twin 
goals: to correct those USPTO examination errors that improperly 
allowed patents to issue, and to do so more cheaply, accurately, and 
accessibly than the federal courts could. 
Cost-wise, the USPTO’s ex parte reexamination fee has grown 
from $1,500 in the early 1980s43 to $12,000 at present,44 and 
attorney costs have risen to approximately $20,000 at the mean and 
$15,000 at the median.45 Even today, the expense of ex parte 
reexamination tends to be below $35,000—some twentyfold less 
costly than the lowest-stakes category of litigation.46 Moreover, when 
the USPTO decides to deny a request for ex parte reexamination, the 
agency refunds most of the fee to the requester, further lowering the 
financial hurdle, and risk, to a patent validity challenge.47 Consistent 
with its mandate to correct examination errors, ex parte 
reexamination requires a “substantial new question of patentability” 
as to one or more of the challenged patent claims, and this standard 
may be met by reargument of information that was previously before 
the patent examiner.48 Access to reexamination is also unconstrained 
by traditional Article III standing requirements. Anyone at any time 
may seek reexamination of a patent, including the patent owner and 
 
 42. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
 43. Revision of Patent Fees, 50 Fed. Reg. 31818-01 (Aug. 6, 1985), codified in 
various parts of 37 C.F.R. Part 1. 
 44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1).  
 45. See AIPLA SURVEY 2013, supra note 20, at I-112 (tabulating attorney costs 
reported for ex parte reexamination); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-136 (2011); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-114 (2009); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-76 (2007). 
 46. Janis, supra note 17. 
 47. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(c); 37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c). 
 48. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a). 
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the USPTO itself,49 and courts narrowly construe agreements not to 
challenge patent validity, in favor of access to reexamination.50 
However, for all its intended benefits, the reexamination 
procedure introduced in 1980 has long been criticized for its ex parte 
nature, which excludes any third-party participation beyond filing 
the initial request.51 According to the PTO’s statistics,52 29 percent of 
the ex parte reexaminations filed between July 1981 and September 
2014 were filed by the patent owner itself, presumably as a potential 
mechanism for strengthening the patent.53 
2. Inter Partes Reexamination 
To improve public participation in the administrative review of 
patent validity, in 1999 Congress created a new procedure: inter 
partes reexamination.54 Designed to coexist with the old ex parte 
procedure, inter partes reexamination conferred significant rights 
upon third-party requestors to participate in the USPTO’s review of 
patent validity. A requestor could comment on every substantive 
response by the patent owner to an examiner action and could appeal 
the examiner’s decision to the USPTO’s administrative review board. 
However, inter partes reexamination also posed significant 
barriers. One was a strong estoppel provision, barring the challenger 
 
 49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303(a). 
 50. See, e.g., Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Mine Serv. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir. 
1987). 
 51. Janis, supra note 17, at 6 n.12 (citing Shannon M. Casey, The Patent 
Reexamination Reform Act of 1994: A New Era of Third Party Participation, 2 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 559 (1995)); Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to Change the 
Patent Reexamination Statute to Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 887, 898 (1994); Gregor N. Neff, Patent Reexamination—
Valuable, But Flawed: Recommendations for Change, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 575 (1986). 
 52. See USPTO, Ex parte Reexamination Filing Data—September 30, 2014, 
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexamination-
information [http://perma.cc/WP77-V8T8]. 
 53. Certain Federal Circuit cases have indicated that patents that survive 
reexamination should be viewed even more deferentially by the courts than 
ordinary patents. E.g., Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 
1983) (explaining that reexamination ought to “facilitate trial of [the reexamined] 
issue by providing the district court with the expert view of the PTO (when a claim 
survives the reexamination proceeding)”) (emphasis added). 
 54. See generally Kenneth L. Cage & Lawrence T. Cullen, An Overview of 
Inter Partes Reexamination Procedures, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 931 
(2003) (explaining the structural details and concerns motivating the 1999 inter 
partes reexamination procedures). 
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from raising in Article III litigation any issues it raised or could have 
raised during the inter partes reexamination.55 Even more 
significant was the prolonged duration of reexamination. The 
reexaminations themselves took an average of 39.5 months, and then 
had to be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences.56 From its creation in 1999 through 2012, when it was 
subsumed under the new administrative review system established 
by the AIA, inter partes reexamination was never widely used as a 
means for challenging the validity of patents.57 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE OPPOSITION UNDER THE AIA 
The America Invents Act of 201158 (AIA), which created four new 
procedures for reevaluating the validity of patents, significantly 
strengthened the U.S. system for administrative review of patent 
validity. One procedure, post-grant review, is just beginning its 
operation as it only applies to patents that issue from applications 
filed under the AIA’s new first-inventor-to-file regime.59 Another 
procedure, supplemental examination, allows patent owners 
themselves to provide new information that helps fortify the validity 
of their patents.60 Thus far, the opportunity for robust public 
participation in challenging pre-existing patents has arisen in the 
two remaining procedures: inter partes review (IPR) and the 
transitional program for covered business method (CBM) review.  
 
 55. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2000); see, e.g., M. Patricia Thayer et al., Examining 
Reexamination: Not Yet an Antidote to Litigation, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 24 
(2004) (noting that estoppel makes “inter partes reexamination something of a 
double-or-nothing gamble”). 
 56. This average included some outlier cases, but the median was a lengthy 
34.1 months. See Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, USPTO, http://www
.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexamination-information 
[http://perma.cc/82NT-8L67]. 
 57. From November 29, 1999, through the abolition of inter partes 
reexamination effective September 16, 2012, fewer than 2,000 requests were filed, 
and in most years the usage of inter partes reexamination represented only a 
fraction of ex parte reexamination. See Reexamination Statistics, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexamination-
information [http://perma.cc/82NT-8L67]. 
 58. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.  
 59. As of October 31, 2015, only thirteen post-grant review petitions have been 
filed in the USPTO. See USPTO, PATENT REVIEW PROCESSING SYSTEM (Oct. 31, 2015) 
at 2, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-10-31%20PTAB
.pdf [http://perma.cc/V2N8-EJT9]. 
 60. 35 U.S.C. § 257. 
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Before turning to the specifics of these proceedings, we note the 
AIA’s desire to promote administrative review is probably clearest in 
the situation where the petitioner is a prior district court defendant. 
In the case of inter partes review, this “standard model” is endorsed, 
at least implicitly, by several features we discuss in detail below. One 
feature is the requirement that IPR review occur within one year of a 
prior district court lawsuit. The congressional decision to include a 
strong estoppel provision, and thus potentially set up in the 
administrative context the Article III collective action problem for 
challengers,61 may also reflect congressional embrace of the standard 
model. 
In the case of CBM review, Congress embraced the standard 
model even more fully. CBM review explicitly requires the petitioner 
to be “charged with infringement,” language the PTO has interpreted 
as requiring the petitioner to prove standing necessary to bring a 
declaratory judgment action in district court.62 
That said, in the case of IPRs, the statutory language certainly 
does not preclude petitioners that are outside the standard model. 
IPR proceedings have no standing requirement, and the AIA also 
provides for potential collective action by allowing joinder to existing 
petitions. 
Thus far, the new AIA proceedings do appear substantially 
cheaper than district court litigation. According to the 2015 AIPLA 
Economic Survey, the median cost of an IPR through a PTAB hearing 
was $275,000 and through appeal was $350,000.63 Although the 
AIPLA survey does not differentiate between IPRs based on amount 
of money at risk, these figures are substantially lower than the 
median cost of district court litigation even for the lowest stakes 
cases.64 
1. Inter Partes Review 
IPR challenges are available to anyone, other than the patent 
owner,65 who has not previously sought to invalidate the patent 
 
 61. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 62. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (“Charged with infringement means a real and 
substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method 
patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory 
judgment action in Federal court.”). 
 63. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 38 (2015). 
 64. See supra Section I.A. 
 65. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). 
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through a civil action66 and who has not been sued more than one 
year earlier for infringing the patent in question.67 An IPR petition 
may not be filed anonymously: the petitioner must disclose all its real 
parties in interest.68 For any patent that issued under the old first-
to-invent regime, an IPR petitioner may file a challenge 
immediately.69 
For a patent that issues under the new first-inventor-to-file 
regime, an IPR petitioner may file a challenge only after nine months 
from the patent’s date of grant or after the termination of any post-
grant review that has been instituted as to the patent, whichever is 
later.70 An IPR may challenge patent claims only on the grounds that 
they fail to satisfy the novelty requirement71 or the nonobviousness 
requirement,72 and may only argue on the basis of prior patents or 
printed publications.73 To decide that an IPR petition warrants 
institution of an IPR proceeding, the USPTO must find a “reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 
[one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”74 
2. Covered Business Method Review 
CBM challenges are available only to parties who have previously 
been sued for infringing, or charged with infringing, the patent in 
question.75 Like IPR petitions, CBM review petitions may not be filed 
anonymously—they must disclose real parties in interest.76 Through 
rulemaking, the PTO has interpreted the statutory “charged with 
infringement” language to mean “a real and substantial controversy 
regarding infringement . . . exists such that the petitioner would have 
 
 66. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (3) (providing that a counterclaim challenging 
the validity of a patent claim in an infringement action is not a civil action). 
 67. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
 68. This disclosure is necessary because the constraints on who can petition 
also apply to all legal privies and real parties in interest of the would-be petitioner. 
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (b). 
 69. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c). 
 70. Id. 
 71. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 72. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
 74. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
 75. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 
Stat. 330 (stating the prior infringement suit may be one that targeted the CBM 
petitioner itself or its privies or real parties in interest). 
 76. See id. 
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standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal Court.”77 
Congressional creation of a standing requirement in a CBM review 
proceeding contrasts with the absence of such a requirement in an 
IPR proceeding. In general, to the extent that IPR and CBM review 
provisions differ (and we detail other differences below), these 
differences may arise because CBM review was inserted into the AIA 
relatively late in the day, and the members of Congress most 
responsible for the review saw CBM patents as categorically 
suspect.78 
For any eligible business method patent79 that issued under the 
old first-to-invent regime, a CBM petitioner may file a challenge at 
any time after the procedure was established on September 16, 
2012.80 For an eligible business method patent that issues under the 
 
 77. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a). 
 78. Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version of the CBM provision 
as part of a floor managers’ amendment on March 1, 2011, were highly suspicious 
of all business method patents. In his March 2011 Senate floor testimony, Senator 
Schumer described business method patents as “the bane of the patent world” and 
castigated the decision the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank to allow such 
patents. 157 CONG REC. S1363 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). Among 
many Senators on the Republican side, positions were equally strong. The Senate 
Republican Policy Committee’s summary of § 18, introduced into the 
Congressional Record by Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately):  
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year Supreme Court 
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the 
patenting of business methods, emphasizing that these 
“inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening 
years, however, PTO was obliged to issue a large number of 
business-method patents, many or possibly all of which are no 
longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a relatively cheap 
alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and will 
reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of 
invalid business-method patents.  
157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 79. The AIA defines an eligible “business method” patent as: “a patent that 
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or 
other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial 
product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological 
inventions.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125 
Stat. 331. USPTO regulations further define a “technological invention” based on 
“whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that 
is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a 
technical solution.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b). 
 80. CBM challenges became available one year from the enactment of the AIA, 
which was signed into law on September 16, 2011. Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 329. 
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new first-inventor-to-file regime, a CBM petitioner may file a 
challenge only after nine months from the patent’s date of grant or 
after the termination of any post-grant review that has been 
instituted as to the patent, whichever is later.81 A CBM petition may 
challenge patent claims on essentially the complete range of 
patentability criteria, including subject-matter eligibility,82 
novelty,83 nonobviousness,84 utility,85 single invention,86 
enablement,87 written description,88 definiteness,89 and others.90 To 
decide that a CBM petition warrants institution of a CBM review, the 
USPTO must find that “it is more likely than not that at least [one] of 
the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable,”91 or that “the 
petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to 
other patents or patent applications.”92 
3. Intersection with the Courts 
Both IPR and CBM review proceedings generate estoppel effects, 
though not in the same way. The estoppel generated by IPR is quite 
strong. An IPR resulting in a final written decision precludes the 
petitioner93 from asserting any claim in either the USPTO, the federal 
courts, or the International Trade Commission (ITC) that the 
petitioner raised, or could have raised, in the IPR proceeding.94 
 
 81. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 
Stat. 329 (incorporating into CBM review the same standards that apply to post-
grant review proceedings as codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329). 
 82. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 83. 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 85. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
 86. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing an inventor or discoverer to “obtain a 
patent”) (emphasis added). 
 87. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 88. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 89. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). 
 90. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (allowing challenges on any invalidity defense 
available under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) and § 282(b)(3), and under 35 U.S.C. § 251). 
Additional constraints also apply to novelty- or nonobviousness-based challenges 
based on pre-AIA § 102 or § 103. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(C), 125 Stat. 330. 
 91. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a). 
 92. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b). 
 93. The same estoppel effects bind the petitioner’s privies and real parties in 
interest. 
 94. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 
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By contrast, a CBM review that results in a final written decision 
creates full estoppel within the USPTO only—it precludes the 
petitioner95 from asserting any claim in the USPTO that the 
petitioner raised, or could have raised, in the CBM review 
proceeding.96 With respect to the courts, CBM petitioners are not 
estopped from invoking those invalidity grounds that they raised at 
the USPTO.97 
Both IPR and CBM review proceedings trigger automatic stays of 
co-pending declaratory judgment litigation. Just as a would-be 
petitioner cannot challenge a patent in an IPR if it has previously 
challenged that patent in a civil action,98 if a petitioner files such a 
civil action after the IPR petition, then that civil action is 
automatically stayed.99 The stay may be lifted only if the patent 
owner requests it, if the patent owner claims or counterclaims 
infringement against the petitioner, or if the petitioner dismisses its 
civil action.100 Likewise, if a petitioner files a civil action challenging 
the patent after filing a CBM petition on the same patent, then that 
civil action must automatically be stayed.101 As with IPR, an 
automatic CBM stay may be lifted only if the patent owner requests 
it, if the patent owner claims or counterclaims infringement against 
the petitioner, or if the petitioner dismisses its civil action.102 
Meanwhile, courts still have the discretion to stay existing 
infringement litigation brought by a patent owner pending the 
outcome of an IPR or CBM review proceeding. For IPRs, where the 
AIA does not specify the standard for such stays, prior standards 
pertaining to ex parte and inter partes reexamination remain 
 
 95. The same estoppel effects bind the petitioner’s privies and real parties in 
interest. 
 96. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1). In general, the provisions of post-grant review, 
which apply to patents filed under the first-inventor-to-file system, also apply to 
CBM review, unless Section 18 of the AIA otherwise specifies.  
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) generally estops the relitigation in court of 
arguments that were raised or could have been raised in the USPTO, but AIA § 18 
provides that § 325(e)(2) does not apply to CBM proceedings—meaning that 
patent validity challengers are free to raise those arguments again in the courts. 
 98. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (3) and supra text accompanying note 66. 
 99. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2). 
 100. Id. 
 101. 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2). 
 102. Id. 
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valuable, though not conclusive, precedent.103 Drawing on the 
reexamination case law, courts continue to consider the familiar 
three factors in deciding whether to issue stays: the potential for 
prejudice or tactical disadvantage; the timing of the desired stay 
relative to that of the administrative proceeding itself; and the 
likelihood that resolution of the administrative proceeding may 
simplify the pending litigation.104 
Notably, the AIA specifies a four-factor test for CBM-related 
stays. This four-factor test encompasses three factors courts 
previously used in determining contested motions for stay under the 
old reexamination system and adds a fourth factor—“whether a stay, 
or the denial thereof, would reduce the burden of litigation on the 
parties and on the court.”105 Moreover, for purposes of “ensur[ing] 
consistent application of established precedent,” the AIA provides 
for immediate interlocutory appeal of the district court’s decision 
regarding stays.106 It also states the Federal Circuit’s standard of 
review on appeal from a district court decision “may be de novo.”107 
Using this standard, the Federal Circuit has held that district courts 
have limited discretion to deny CBM-related stays when all claims 
asserted in litigation are also under CBM review.108 
In general, the AIA’s legislative history indicates Congress 
wanted both IPRs and CBM reviews to serve as a substitute for 
Article III litigation over patent validity. However, for those 
defendants who are charged with infringement of a patent that falls 
within the “covered business method” designation, the broader 
number of grounds available for challenge, less onerous estoppel 
 
 103. See Matthew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review 
and Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 469, 469 (2015) (“The courts 
have precedent in reviewing motions to stay litigation pending the reexamination 
procedure; however, the newly enacted statutory limitations have made this issue 
ripe for judicial review.”). 
 104. Id. at 473 (citing Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc., 
943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030–33 (C.D. Cal. 2013)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) and 
accompanying text. 
 105. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat. 
284. 
 106. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(2), 125 Stat. 
331. 
 107. Id. 
 108. VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1309–10, 1320 
(Fed. Cir. 2014). 
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provisions, and a codified stay provision likely make CBM review 
even more attractive than IPR. 
II. AGENCY OR COURT: STRATEGIC CHOICES 
To describe more fully how these doctrinal frameworks operate 
in practice, we offer here the largest-scale empirical study to date of 
ex post administrative scrutiny of patent validity. Our analysis is 
based on a new dataset of all IPR and CBM petitions filed in the 
USPTO since the creation of these procedures under the AIA, as well 
as data on Article III patent cases filed contemporaneously with IPR 
and CBM petitions, and on requests for litigation stays pending the 
outcome of administrative challenges to patent validity. Our findings 
provide a comprehensive view of ex post administrative review that 
assimilates the more localized findings of prior empirical studies.109 
We begin with the individual patent as our basic unit of analysis and 
further explore patent-petitioner pairs and other details. Unless 
otherwise specified, our time period is from September 16, 2012 
through June 30, 2015. 
Our analysis can be replicated using data from the 
DocketNavigator service, which provides free and low-cost access to 
coded metadata about patent cases in the U.S. federal courts as well 
as the PTAB.110 Like LexMachina111 and other widely used patent 
litigation data services, DocketNavigator obtains its underlying 
litigation data from the federal judiciary’s Public Access to Court 
Electronic Records (PACER) service,112 which is the principal data 
source of many innovation studies.113 Neither PACER nor the 
 
 109. E.g., Love & Ambwani, supra note 3. 
 110. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://home.docketnavigator.com/ourstory 
[http://perma.cc/B4AP-SB4M]. 
 111. LEXMACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/how-it-works 
[http://perma.cc/WA5J-UEDV]. 
 112. PACER, http://www.pacer.gov [http://perma.cc/YP39-UJZ3]; see Judy L. 
Heier, Researching Patent Litigation Made Easy, RECORDER (May 13, 2013), 
http://home.docketnavigator.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Recorder-
Article.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ERK-XS3T] (stating that DocketNavigator obtains 
litigation data from PACER). 
 113. E.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, 
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769, 
1772 (2014) (identifying Lex Machina, which obtains and cleans original PACER 
information, as the data source); Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, 
Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1440–41 (2009) (identifying PACER 
as the data source); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases 
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commercial services that rely on it permit researchers to disclose 
significant portions of their database. Accordingly, we describe the 
DocketNavigator data we used with the understanding that other 
researchers can readily access it to replicate our study.114 
A. LITIGANT BEHAVIOR 
Like the administrative ex post validity challenge mechanisms 
that preceded the AIA, the IPR and CBM review procedures were 
established to provide more affordable, more expert, and more 
accessible adjudication than litigation. However, what would-be 
patent challengers regard as barriers115 to contesting validity, are 
safeguards from the perspective of patent owners. We are quite 
interested, therefore, in discovering whether and under what 
circumstances IPR and CBM reviews are serving as defensive tools 
for defendants previously charged in district court with 
infringement; as tools for preemptive attacks upon patent owners; as 
mechanisms for harassment and abuse; or as a mix of these 
functions. 
In general, we show that most patents challenged in the PTAB are 
also challenged in Article III litigation. However, there is no clear 
relationship between the number of times a patent is challenged in 
the PTAB and the numbers of times it is asserted in district court. 
Additionally, while Chemical patents are disproportionately likely to 
be the subject of a PTAB-only challenge, Computers and 
Communications (CCM) patents are disproportionately unlikely to 
be challenged only in the PTAB. 
We also studied behavior at the level of the individual petitioner. 
For both CBM reviews and IPRs, the standard substitution model 
describes the majority of cases. Notably, however, in the context of 
IPRs, the percentage of petitioners who fall outside the standard 
model because they have not themselves previously been sued on the 
 
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of 
Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 266 (2006) (identifying PACER as the 
data source). 
 114. See infra Appendix A. 
 115. Such barriers include, for example, potential estoppel in the federal courts 
from initiating an administrative validity challenge in the USPTO. Supra Section 
I.C.3. More generally, as discussed in detail in Part II, patent challengers face a 
significant collective action problem. See Thomas, supra note 37, at 333 (noting 
that third parties to a successful validity challenge “may readily free ride from the 
efforts of the former patentee and the opponent, employing the teachings of the 
invalidated patent to practice the invention without compensation to anyone”). 
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patent in question is surprisingly substantial, on the order of 30 
percent. This percentage is particularly high with respect to Drugs 
and Medical patents. Also notable is the extent to which petitioners 
that have not previously been sued join the same petitions as those 
that have been sued. In the case of Drugs and Medical patents, for 
example, petitioners that have not previously been defendants 
disproportionately appear to be engaged in collective action with 
those that are defendants.  
1. IPR and CBM Petitions: Descriptive Statistics 
a) IPR Petitions 
Through the end of June 2015, petitioners have filed 3,157 
petitions for inter partes review. As Figure 1 shows,116 these filings 
began slowly in September 2012, when the IPR procedure became 
available, and have risen from twenty petitions per month to roughly 
140 petitions per month. 
These petitions have been distributed unevenly across technology 
areas. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
categorizes patents into six different technology areas: (1) Chemical 
(excluding Drugs); (2) Computers and Communications (CCM); (3) 
Drugs and Medical; (4) Electrical and Electronics; (5) Mechanical; 
and (6) Others.117 As Figure 2 shows, IPR petitions disaggregated by 
NBER’s six-part category scheme have predominantly challenged 
CCM-related patents, which account for just over half (50.4%) of all 
IPR petitions. Figure 3 confirms this trend has persisted from the 
start, with cumulative filings in CCM-related IPR petitions rising 
considerably faster than those in all other technology areas. 
Although IPR petitions may challenge patent claims as to either 
novelty or nonobviousness, nonobviousness challenges predominate 
across all major technology areas. As Figure 4 shows, nearly all IPR 
petitions include a nonobviousness challenge, whereas the 
proportion of IPR petitions that include a novelty challenge varies 
considerably by technology. The preference for including 
 
 116. Figures are presented in Appendix B  
 117. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The 
NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 13 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), 
http://www.nber.org/patents [http://perma.cc/NY76-VHVV] (articulating and 
defining the NBER classification system and its concordance with the U.S. Patent 
Classification system). 
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nonobviousness as a basis for challenge is not surprising. While a 
novelty-based challenge must rest on a single reference, a 
nonobviousness-based challenge can presumably take advantage of 
the ability of PTAB judges to engage in complex reasoning that 
combines multiple references.118 
b) CBM Petitions 
Compared to IPR petitions, usage of the CBM procedure has been 
considerably smaller in scale. Through the end of May 2015, 
petitioners have filed 362 petitions for CBM review. As Figure 5 
shows, these filings have averaged between ten and fifteen petitions 
per month. Moreover, because CBM proceedings are oriented by 
definition toward business-method-related technologies such as 
information and communications, it is unsurprising that an 
overwhelming majority (82.2%) of CBM petitions challenge 
Computers and Communications-related patents. Mechanical-
related patents make up another 15.9% of CBM petitions, and only a 
negligible share of CBM petitions fall in any other category. Figure 6 
illustrates these trends. 
Unlike IPR petitions, CBM petitions may challenge patent claims 
on a fuller range of patentability requirements: in addition to novelty 
and nonobviousness, subject-matter eligibility, enablement, written 
description, and indefiniteness are available grounds. Across this 
range of options, however, petitioners have focused their attention 
primarily on subject-matter eligibility and nonobviousness. As 
Figure 7 shows, 68.6% of CBM petitions challenged the subject-
matter eligibility of the patent in dispute, and 71.1% challenged the 
nonobviousness of the patent. Just under half (48.3%) challenged 
novelty. By contrast, challenges as to enablement, written 
description, and indefiniteness each arose in fewer than 20% of 
petitions. 
As with IPR petitions, the relative preference for nonobviousness 
challenges over novelty challenges in CBM petitions is rational given 
the greater availability of combining prior art references in 
evaluating nonobviousness. In addition, the strong preference for 
 
 118. John Schroeder, First Ever Inter Partes Review Decision Finds Claims 
Not Patentable, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=d699d660-d5da-4953-af0f-a88e3d3152d2 [perma.cc/CW4C-DGK6] 
(noting “the general consensus that inter partes review may yield better results 
[than juries in district court litigation] when relying on complex invalidity 
arguments hinging on a combination of prior art references”). 
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subject-matter eligibility challenges is consistent with the 
widespread view among critics of business method patents that such 
patents are not just narrowly problematic for inadequate disclosure 
in the patent specification or lack clarity in the claims—problems that 
are more the purview of enablement, written description, and 
indefiniteness—but instead are outside the scope of what should be 
eligible for patent protection in the first place.119 
Beyond these basic PTAB filing trends, we find that a number of 
patents have been targets of serial challenges spread across both 
multiple petitions and multiple challengers in IPR petitions. Patents 
in the Chemical, CCM, and Electrical areas are particularly prone to 
multiple petitions. As Figure 8 shows, a majority of patents in each 
of these fields were the subject of multiple IPR petitions: 60.6% of 
Chemical patents, 50.9% of CCM patents, and 58.4% of Electrical 
patents. Figure 9 shows how these serial challenges are distributed 
within technology categories, notably that the highest volume of 
serial challenges is in the CCM area. We are currently studying the 
precise nature of these serial challenges (for example, whether they 
are being brought by the same petitioner) to determine whether they 
could represent harassment and therefore are problematic from a 
 
 119. This view was held by Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version 
of the CBM provision as part of a floor managers’ amendment on March 1, 2011. In 
his March 2011 Senate floor testimony, Senator Schumer described business 
method patents as “the bane of the patent world” and castigated the decision the 
Federal Circuit in State Street Bank to allow such patents. 157 CONG REC. S1363 
(March 8, 2011) (statement of Senator Schumer). Among many Senators on the 
Republican side, positions were equally strong. The Senate Republican Policy 
Committee’s summary of § 18, introduced into the Congressional Record by 
Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately): 
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year Supreme Court 
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the 
patenting of business methods, emphasizing that these 
“inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening 
years, however, PTO was obliged to issue a large number of 
business-method patents, many or possibly all of which are no 
longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a relatively cheap 
alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and will 
reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of 
invalid business-method patents.  
157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(emphasizing the “nature of the patent” as a newly relevant consideration in 
enforcement and accusing business method patents in particular of “potential 
vagueness and suspect validity”). 
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policy perspective. The frequency of serial challenge to a patent may 
also be related to the number of defendants against whom the patent 
is asserted in court. 
We turn next to the general question of the relationship between 
patent challenges at the PTAB and patent litigation in the district 
courts. 
2. Article III Litigation 
Contemporaneous with petitions for IPR and CBM review in the 
USPTO, patent litigation in the federal courts has continued apace. 
To investigate the interaction between these two fora, we collected 
data on all 24,162 patent cases filed between September 16, 2011, and 
June 30, 2015, in the federal district courts.120 
Many of these cases involved multiple patents-in-suit, and we 
observed a total of 47,764 patent assertions across these cases,121 or 
an average of 1.98 assertions per patent case. Figure 10 shows the 
trend in patent cases over this period rising from 150 case filings per 
month in September 2011 to an average of over 500 case filings per 
month by June 2015. These petitions have also been distributed 
unevenly across technology areas. Figure 11 shows that patent cases 
have predominantly involved CCM-related patents, which far 
outpace all other technology areas, and that this trend has persisted 
from the start, with cumulative filings in CCM-related patent cases 
rising considerably faster than in all other technology areas.122 
During this time, a total of 14,218 patents were either challenged 
in an IPR or CBM petition, asserted in litigation, or both. A subset of 
 
 120. We chose September 16, 2011 as our starting date for district court 
litigation because it represents the first date on which patents asserted in litigation 
could become the subject of a PTAB filing. Consistent with our interest in 
examining the interaction between assertion by patent owners and PTAB petitions, 
we excluded declaratory judgment actions. In any event, as discussed in the text, 
the AIA essentially makes declaratory judgment actions unavailable to those who 
file PTAB petitions. See supra Part I. 
 121. Though the data that we collected include cases where design and plant 
patents were asserted (either exclusively or together with utility patents), we focus 
our analysis on utility patents. 
 122. Because district court cases can (and frequently do) involve multiple-
patents in a single suit—unlike IPR or CBM petitions, which are necessarily limited 
to a single patent—we calculate technology trends by aggregating a technology’s 
relative share among the patents that were asserted in each case. For example, a 
patent case involving three CCM patents and two Electrical patents would have 
been counted as 0.6 of a CCM case and 0.4 of an Electrical case. 
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11,787 patents were involved in litigation alone; 324 patents were 
involved in a USPTO proceeding alone; and 2,107 patents were 
involved in both. Accordingly, about 15.2% of litigated patents are 
also being challenged in the PTAB,123 and about 86.7% of IPR- or 
CBM-challenged patents are also being litigated in the federal 
courts.124 
These measures suggest validity challenges in the USPTO are, 
indeed, connected with the threat or fact of infringement litigation, 
for a large majority of challenged patents are also asserted in court. 
Indeed, our measures may understate the connection the connection 
between Article III litigation and assertion at the PTAB. According to 
Lex Machina analytics, of the patent cases filed in the U.S. district 
courts during the time period that we studied, 70.2% were likely 
settled. Moreover, three-quarters of those likely settlements 
occurred within 9.9 months. This pattern of likely settlement may 
have been prompted, at least in part, by a defendant’s threat to file  a  
challenge  at  the  PTAB.  In addition, typically only 10% of patent 
lawsuits reach the stage at which they would receive a claim 
construction ruling. This 10% figure is in line with our finding that 
15.2% of litigated patents are being challenged in the PTAB. It is 
worth noting that a patent challenged at the PTAB would receive an 
early claim construction at the institution stage in the IPR/CBM 
process. That said, we do not imply that the same 10% of patent cases 
that reach the claim construction stage in district court are also the 
same patents that are the subject of a challenge at the PTAB. 
Our data indicate that patents challenged in the PTAB are, on 
average, also asserted at least three times in court. As Figure 12 
indicates, however, this average reflects considerable variation (as 
shown by the error bars representing one standard deviation of the 
mean). At least when the group of patents involved in IPR and CBM 
proceedings is considered as a whole—that is, without disaggregation 
by technology and district court—the relationship between the 
number of IPR or CBM petitions that were filed on a patent and the 
number of times that the patent was asserted in district court is not 
monotonic. Finally, of course, most patents asserted in district court 
are not challenged at the PTAB. 
 
 123. This is calculated as 2107  / ( 2107 + 11787 ) = 15.2%. 
 124. This is calculated as 2107 / ( 2107 + 324 ) = 86.7%. 
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To further investigate the relationship between PTAB challenges 
and Article III assertions, we evaluated a series of measures 
constructed from the underlying data. 
a) IPR and CBM Reviews with Litigation in the Offing 
In light of the intended uses of IPR and CBM review as substitutes 
for federal court litigation, notably, in a number of cases, a given 
patent was challenged in a PTAB petition before that patent was 
asserted in litigation. This is a relatively rare occurrence. As of June 
30, 2015, 2107 patents have been the subjects of both a PTAB 
challenge (either in IPR or CBM) and of district court litigation. Only 
fifty-eight of these patents (2.75%) were challenged in district court 
litigation simultaneously with or after the first PTAB challenge, 
rather than before. 
Their small number notwithstanding, these cases arguably 
represent a challenge to the standard model of a PTAB challenge as 
a substitute for ongoing litigation. However, a relatively small 
variation to that standard model could encompass the case where 
litigation was actually imminent. In other words, in these 
circumstances the filing of a petition in the PTAB was similar to a 
declaratory judgment action. That is, indeed, what we find. Of the 
fifty-eight patents that were challenged in the PTAB before any 
litigation, forty-seven patents (81.0%) were challenged by petitioners 
who were subsequently named as defendants in federal court 
litigation over the same patents. 
b) IPR and CBM Reviews with No Related Litigation 
Another phenomenon that must be reconciled with the standard 
model is that some patents are challenged in the PTAB but have not 
been observed in litigation at all, either before or after the petition 
for IPR or CBM review. Though a PTAB validity challenge is a 
reasonable substitute for litigation that has already begun or is 
imminent, it may be a potentially counterproductive approach for 
anyone else:125 particularly in the case of an IPR (where, as 
 
 125. For example, the filing fees for IPR are $9,000 at the petition stage and 
$14,000 at the post-institution stage. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a). The filing fees for CBM 
review are even higher: $12,000 at the petition stage and $18,000 at the post-
institution stage. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(b). Contemporaneous estimates of average 
attorney costs were over $130,000. Olga Berson, Challenging Patent Validity 
Under the AIA: Strategic and Tactical Considerations When Deciding Whether to 
Pursue Ex parte Reexamination or Inter Partes Review As Part of the Overall 
Litigation Strategy, 2012 WL 6636452, *12 (2012). 
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contrasted with the CBM review, the petitioner does not have to be 
charged in any way with infringement), such a challenger might 
simply raise unwanted attention to its potentially infringing 
activities. Indeed, IPRs or CBM reviews with no related litigation are 
a somewhat rare occurrence. As of June 30, 2015, only 324 patents 
(13.3% of all patents challenged in the PTAB) have been challenged 
in the PTAB with no related litigation observed in the federal courts. 
But even the existence of such a subset might be considered peculiar. 
There are several potential reasons for this unexpected subset. 
One is statistical censoring: the PTAB challenges are simply so recent 
that the patent owner has not filed responsive litigation yet, but may 
do so in the relatively near term. Censoring, however, does not 
appear to explain the subset fully. Petitions on such “PTAB-only” 
patents have been filed from the earliest days of IPR and CBM review 
in September 2012. Of the 324 patents challenged in the PTAB with 
no related litigation, 163 (50.3%) had been challenged in petitions 
filed more than one year before June 30, 2015 – that is, in or before 
June 2014.  In other words, many of the patent owners have had 
ample time to bring infringement actions against the petitioners who 
filed for IPR or CBM review and have not yet done so. So it is still 
possible, but increasingly unlikely, that a patent owner who has not 
asserted a patent against an IPR or CBM challenger will do so now. 
A second possible reason for this phenomenon is statistical 
selection, including technology-specific selection: where a PTAB 
validity challenge is sufficiently strong, and a patent owner’s 
countervailing infringement claim against the PTAB challenger is 
sufficiently weak, an invalidity challenge might arise without any 
corresponding infringement assertion. This kind of selection effect, 
however, would require that both parties have information ex ante 
about the relative merits of each other’s case, i.e., about the 
boundaries and legal viability of the patent in dispute, that is both 
adequate and roughly symmetric. Such ex ante clarity may be 
possible for Chemical and Drugs and Medical patents, where 
technical nomenclature is standardized and the boundaries of the 
invention are amenable to delineation.126 Ex ante clarity may even be 
possible for Electrical and Mechanical patents if the patent discloses 
sufficiently detailed structural information. However, patents on 
 
 126. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice 
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 36 (2013). Indeed, in the case of certain drugs 
(so-called small molecule drugs), patents asserted to cover the drug are specifically 
on the FDA “Orange Book.”  
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CCM inventions that are claimed in functional terms would be much 
less likely to provide enough ex ante clarity that a PTAB challenge 
would be so plainly strong, and a retaliatory infringement suit so 
plainly weak, as to produce an IPR or CBM review with no litigation 
in response. 
Additionally, in at least some technology areas, the number of 
patents that are clearly “important” as a matter of potential litigation 
risk may be relatively small and easy to identify. Particularly in the 
context of IPRs (which can be filed even without any assertion of 
infringement on the part of the patentee), the high volume of CCM-
related patents may make it unclear which patents are most 
important. 
The data are consistent with technology-specific selection effects 
across the three subsets of (1) patents that were only challenged in 
the PTAB, (2) patents that were only asserted in litigation, and (3) 
patents that were both challenged in the PTAB and asserted in 
litigation as summarized in Figure 13. Comparing PTAB-only patents 
with district court-only patents, the technology distributions were 
mostly similar. In both subsets, CCM patents accounted for about a 
third (32.8% and 37.1%, respectively); Drugs and Medical patents 
about a fifth (20.6% and 19.7%, respectively); Electrical patents a 
little less than a seventh (13.9% and 11.3%, respectively); and 
Mechanical patents a little more than a tenth (11.5% and 10.1%, 
respectively).127 Only Chemical patents occupied a significantly 
greater share of PTAB-only patents (12.5%) than of district court-
only patents (4.9%).128 
The most notable difference was for patents that were both 
challenged in the PTAB and asserted in district court. A majority of 
these PTAB-and-district-court patents (54.7%) were in the CCM 
technology area, as compared with 32.8% of PTAB-only patents.129 
This underrepresentation of CCM patents in the PTAB-only group is 
consistent with the expected lower likelihood that CCM patents offer 
enough ex ante clarity and evidence of importance to produce PTAB 
challenges in situations where there is no federal court litigation. 
 
 127. These differences were not statistically significant (p  > 0.05 using a two-
tailed test of proportions). 
 128. Conversely, “Other” patents occupied a greater share of district court-only 
patents (16.9%) than of PTAB-only patents (8.8%). 
 129. This difference was highly statistically significant (p < 0.0001 using a two-
tailed test of proportions). 
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Having considered the special cases of PTAB validity challenges 
that either precede a district court litigation or have no related 
litigation at all, we now turn to the standard model of PTAB validity 
challenge as a direct response by a defendant in prior infringement 
litigation. 
c) CBM and IPR Challenges As Direct Self Interest 
As we have discussed, a defendant that challenges a patent’s 
validity in the USPTO after the patent has been asserted in litigation 
is the standard use of CBM and IPR petitions. The USPTO’s expertise 
substitutes for the generalist orientation of the courts. We find that, 
overall, CBM and IPR petitions are in fact predominantly assertions 
of the petitioners’ own direct interests with respect to infringement 
liability on the particular patent being challenged.  
In the majority of cases, petitioners for CBM review have 
previously been defendants in federal court litigation where the same 
patent was asserted. Two related measures support this finding. One 
is the share of CBM petitioners (77.9%) who have previously been 
defendants in district court litigations involving the patents they 
later challenge in CBM review. The other is the share of CBM 
petitions (82.7%) in which at least one petitioner was previously a 
defendant as to the patent now being challenged. These results are 
perhaps unsurprising, as CBM petitions can only be brought by those 
sued for, or charged with, infringement. Additionally, though it is not 
particularly meaningful to speak of technology differences among 
CBM petitions,130 Figures 14a and 14b show that the finding also 
persists for each NBER technology category.  
Similarly, in the case of IPRs, the majority (70%) of IPR 
petitioners have previously been defendants in district court 
litigations involving the patents they now challenge. The remaining 
30% of cases in which petitioners are not prior defendants do, 
however, represent an interesting puzzle, particularly if one looks 
across technologies, and also at the percentage of petitions in which 
at least one petitioner was previously a defendant. We turn next to 
this puzzle. 
 
 130. This is because the availability of CBM review is defined, and limited, by 
technology, and as a result, CCM patents have accounted for 82.2% of all CBM 
Petitions, with 15.9% coming from Mechanical patents and 1.9% from Other 
patents. See infra Figure 6. 
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d) IPR Challenges by Entities That Were Not Prior 
Defendants 
As Figure 15a shows, the percentage of IPR petitioners who were 
not prior defendants varies substantially across technologies. 
Notably, because only about 48% of petitioners in the Drugs and 
Medical area have previously been sued, over half of all petitioners 
in this technology are non-standard. In some cases, generic firms 
may be filing even prior to being sued in order to clear the path 
toward eventual entry into the market. In other cases, we know from 
reading IPR petitions to identify petitioners that third parties have 
been active. One active third party is J. Kyle Bass, the principal of 
Hayman Capital Management and of the Coalition for Affordable 
Drugs, who, as of June 30, 2015, had filed at least twenty-eight 
petitions.131 Another is Erich Spangenberg, the chief executive of the 
IP Navigation Group and of nXn Partners, who is a co-petitioner on 
those twenty-eight petitions.132 Both Mr. Bass and Mr. Spangenberg 
have thus far focused their validity challenges entirely on Drugs and 
Medical-related patents. 
Figures 15a and 15b also reveal substantial disparities in certain 
technology areas between the share of petitioners who were 
previously sued and the share of IPR petitions with at least one 
petitioner who was previously a defendant on the challenged patent. 
Specifically, the petitioner vs. petition disparities are quite 
substantial in the categories of Drugs and Medical (48.5% vs. 70.8%), 
Mechanical (53.1% vs. 70.2%), and Other (65.5% vs. 82.6%). The 
disparities reveal that, in each of these technology areas, petitioners 
who are not prior defendants are joining petitions filed by prior 
defendants.  
Arguably, this collective action is socially beneficial, as it directly 
addresses the general collective action problem in challenging 
invalid patents.133 However, to the extent collective action takes the 
form of serial petitions that are joined later to the petition of a prior 
 
 131. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the 
Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-
1428417408 [http://perma.cc/X26M-53QM]. 
 132. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-
will-sue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html [http://perma.cc/R2X6-8D49]. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
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defendant, it could be seen as harassment and delay. Currently, our 
data do not allow us to determine exactly when nondefendant 
petitioners are joining the petitions of defendants. PTO regulations 
do require, however, that a joinder request be filed no later than one 
month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which 
joinder is requested.134 In ongoing research, we are parsing the 
joinder data more finely to look at timing and how the regulations 
are being applied. 
In this regard, it bears mention that fostering collective action is 
the explicit mission of organizations such as Unified Patents, which 
files patent validity challenges on behalf of its member companies in 
order to reduce their patent litigation risk.135 We expect that, in order 
to be effective, such member-based organizations would likely file 
significant numbers of IPR petitions and focus their efforts largely 
on a single technology area. During the time period of our study, 
Unified Patents had, for example, has filed at least twenty-four 
petitions of which seventeen (71%) are against CCM-related patents. 
e) Timing Between the Courts and the USPTO 
Closely related to the “non-standard” petitioner issue is the 
question of time lag between Article III assertion and PTAB 
challenge. Unless the petition includes a request for joinder, a 
petitioner cannot file an IPR challenge more than a year after it has 
been sued for infringing a particular patent.136 As a result, 
administrative validity challenges filed more than one year after the 
last federal court lawsuit prior to a petition are likely to reflect either 
non-standard petitioners and/or petitioners seeking joinder to 
earlier petitions. 
To investigate these issues further, we measured the time lag 
between the first IPR petition on a given patent and the federal court 
litigation on that patent filed most recently prior to the first IPR 
petition. (By definition, the first IPR petition cannot request joinder.) 
As an additional frame of reference for these results, we calculated 
the lag between the first IPR petition on a given patent and the 
earliest observed federal court litigation on that patent. The latter 
measure takes a broad view of how court-agency lags are distributed 
and is likely to contain a small, but non-trivial, number of instances 
 
 134. 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b). 
 135. UNIFIED PATENTS INC., http://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq 
[http://perma.cc/K4XC-4Y23]. 
 136. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2016  3:16 PM 
2016] STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 79 
where the lag is greater than one year. The reason is that, for 
repeatedly-asserted patents, the first defendant sued need not be the 
one that mounts a validity challenge in the USPTO. 
As Figure 17 shows, quite a few patents fit this latter profile: 
nearly a quarter of the distribution (23.4%) exceeds the one-year lag 
from the earliest observed federal court litigation on a given patent, 
reaching upwards of three years for some patents. Notably, a small 
share of patents, roughly 3.3%, shows a negative lag indicating the 
first IPR petition against the patent preceded the first federal court 
assertion of the patent.137 For these patents, administrative validity 
challenges are not defensive in the traditional sense, as no offensive 
litigation has yet been observed; rather, they are, at most, 
preemptive. Most IPR petitions, however, fall within the zero-to-one-
year range, distributed symmetrically about a median lag of six 
months, with a modal spike at the one-year deadline. 
Meanwhile, measuring from the last pre-IPR federal court 
lawsuit to the first IPR petition is likely to capture not only non-
standard petitioners but also cases where earlier lawsuits against 
others have revealed useful information about the patent owner’s 
enforcement strategy so that less time is needed to decide whether 
and how to prepare an IPR challenge. This is, in fact, what the data 
reveal in Figure 18. The majority of cases fall again within the zero-
to-one-year range, but with a median lag roughly four months less 
than in Figure 17. A far smaller share of the distribution (11.4%) 
exceeds one year—presumably this 11.4% comprises non-standard 
petitioners only. As before, a modal spike near and at a one-year lag 
indicates that litigants wait for the statutory deadline. 
These direct and indirect measures suggest that challenges to 
patent validity through inter partes review are primarily—though not 
exclusively—a defensive response to existing litigation. In most cases, 
a prior defendant files an administrative challenge. Other entities, 
acting on this revealed information, may also respond with petitions 
for validity review.  
We now turn to another aspect of strategic behavior in patent 
litigation that has previously presented policy concerns: the 
tendency of patent cases to be filed disproportionately in a few 
judicial districts, so much so that these districts are now widely 
identified with patent litigation. 
 
 137. As we have discussed, these preemptively-challenged patents may reflect 
litigation in the offing or else no related litigation. See supra Sections III.A.2.a–b. 
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f) District-Specific Effects 
Skewed distribution of patent litigation toward particular high-
volume judicial districts and litigant forum-shopping, which not only 
results from this skew but also contributes to it, are well 
documented.138 It is likely, then, that such leading patent courts 
should send commensurately greater numbers of patents into PTAB 
validity challenges as well. Yet in this regard, the data show a 
surprising effect. Of the eight leading district courts—which together 
account for nearly 70% of litigated patents during the observed time 
period—the top three courts were overrepresented in sending 
patents into PTAB validity challenges, and the remaining five were 
underrepresented. 
Figure 16 depicts the fraction of all litigated patents that were 
litigated at least once in a given court and the fraction of all IPR-
challenged patents that were litigated at least once in the same court, 
across the top eight districts for patent litigation. The latter fraction 
was significantly higher than the former for the District of Delaware 
(41.1% vs. 34.4%), the Eastern District of Texas (41.4% vs. 28.5%), 
and the Northern District of California (21.6% vs. 15.2%),139 
indicating that patents litigated in those districts were unusually 
likely to be challenged in inter partes review. The effect was reversed 
for the other high-volume patent districts, including the Central 
District of California (14.1% vs. 16.0%), the District of New Jersey 
(10.0% vs. 13.0%), and the Northern District of Illinois (4.8% vs. 
9.6%).140 
The great disparity we see in the Eastern District of Texas is 
unsurprising—the court’s strong pro-patentee reputation141 would be 
expected to drive defendants to a more strategically favorable forum. 
This effect is likely in spite of the apparently low likelihood of 
defendants either filing or being granted stays in the Eastern District 
of Texas.142 In the cases of the District of Delaware and the Northern 
 
 138. See generally notes 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 139. These differences were highly significant (p < 0.0001 using a two-tailed 
test of proportions). 
 140. These differences were all significant as well (p < 0.05 using a two-tailed 
test of proportions). 
 141. See, e.g., Vishnubhakat, supra note 31, at 65 (discussing the reputation of 
the Eastern District of Texas for producing pro-patentee outcomes). 
 142. PTAB Stay Stats: 2012 to May 31, 2015, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, 
http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/winston-publishes-stats-on-ptab-
stays.html [https://perma.cc/3W7H-Y3Q4]. 
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District of California, the reasons for disproportionately high IPR 
filings are less clear. Defendants may be encouraged, however, by the 
high rate of stay grants in these districts.143 
B. AGENCY DECISIONS 
When petitioned, the PTAB must decide whether to institute an 
IPR or CBM review on the grounds petitioned. If it decides to 
institute a review, the PTAB must then adjudicate the case on its 
merits. Decisions on institution and on the merits are 
interdependent in that the legal standard for instituting an IPR is 
whether the petitioner is reasonably likely to succeed as to at least 
one claim, and the legal standard for instituting a CBM review is 
whether the petitioner is more likely than not to prevail as to at least 
one claim.144 Therefore, the rates of institution are particularly 
important because the very fact of institution is, by statutory design, 
a credible signal about the ultimate outcome of the validity challenge. 
In the case of IPR, an early study that examined petitions filed as 
of March 31, 2014 found that, of those petitions that had reached an 
institution decision by the time of the authors’ analysis in late 2014, 
84.0% had been granted as to at least one challenged claim.145 Our 
analysis, which runs through June 30, 2015, confirms this point 
estimate but reveals a slow and consistent decline in the institution 
rate. Figure 19 compares over time (1) the running total number of 
IPR petition filings, (2) the running total number of institution 
decisions, and (3) the running total number of institution decisions 
granting at least one challenged claim. Calculating the institution 
rate as (3) divided by (2) over time, Figure 20 shows that the rate has 
been declining and is currently 74.8%. 
The earlier study also found that 74.0% of at-least-partially 
instituted petitions were fully instituted. Our data conflict on this 
point. We find that 41.2% of at-least-partially instituted decisions 
made on petitions filed by March 31, 2014 were fully instituted.146  As 
 
 143. Id.  
 144. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(b), supra note 91; LEXMACHINA, supra note 110, and 
accompanying text.  
 145. Love & Ambwani, supra note 3, at 100. 
 146. With respect to petitions filed by March 31, 2014, we observed 851 IPR 
institution decisions (roughly similar to the 823 in the earlier study) and 699 
decisions granting at-least-partial institution (roughly similar to the 691 in the 
earlier study).  These small discrepancies may arise in part because we had the 
benefit of observing PTAB actions on petitions over a longer time horizon.  
RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2016  3:16 PM 
82 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31:1  
of June 30, 2015, 51.4% of at-least-partially instituted petitions were 
fully instituted, and 38.4% of petitions that received an institution 
decision were fully instituted. These trends are summarized in Figure 
21. 
In addition to general institution rates, we also disaggregate 
institution rates by technology area and by the grounds on which 
patent validity was challenged. Figure 22 shows the rates at which 
institutions are granted and denied across technologies for petitions 
arguing a lack of novelty. Petitions on Drugs and Medical-related 
patents have a 59.9% likelihood of being denied,147 and in all other 
technologies, petitions are as likely as not to be instituted (p  > 0.05). 
Figure 23 shows the rates at which institutions are granted and 
denied across technologies for petitions arguing a lack of 
nonobviousness. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the ability of expert 
judges to combine multiple references, nonobviousness petitions are 
more likely than not to be instituted across all technology areas. 
Nonobviousness challenges to Chemical patents are particularly 
likely to be granted, with an institution rate of 68.5%.148  
Meanwhile, for CBM petitions, comparing technology categories 
is not particularly meaningful, as the definition of covered business 
method patents in practice overlaps substantially with CCM-related 
patents. Instead, because CBM review allows the full range of legal 
grounds on which to challenge validity149 and because petitioners 
themselves have availed themselves of these grounds to varying 
degrees,150 comparing the rates at which CBM petitions have been 
instituted with respect to each of these grounds is more meaningful. 
Figure 7 previously showed that subject-matter eligibility under 
§ 101, novelty under § 102, and nonobviousness under § 103 were the 
major grounds on which CBM petitions have been filed whereas the 
enablement, written description, and definiteness requirements of 
§ 112 have been employed relatively infrequently. Because CBM 
review arose out of categorical resistance to business methods as 
 
Truncation does not, however, explain our disparate findings on rates of full 
institution. 
 147. The differences between respective likelihoods of grant and denial are 
highly significant (p < 0.001 using a two-tailed test of proportions). 
 148. The differences between respective likelihoods of grant and denial are 
significant (p < 0.05) for Mechanical-related petitions, and highly significant for all 
other technologies (p < 0.005). Comparisons use a two-tailed test of proportions. 
 149. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2); Frontz, supra note 103; supra note 108. 
 150. See infra Figure 7. 
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patent-eligible subject matter, and inception of CBM review 
coincided with Supreme Court decisions substantially strengthening 
patent eligibility requirements, we expected that subject-matter 
challenges would be the most fertile ground for decisions to institute 
CBM petitions. We expected that the remaining grounds would be 
likely to garner fewer PTAB institutions, though in the particular case 
of nonobviousness, the higher standard imposed by the Supreme 
Court’s 2007 decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.151 might have 
an impact.  
Figure 24 confirms our hypothesis that subject matter eligibility 
would dominate the CBM procedure. Subject matter eligibility-based 
CBM petitions are overwhelmingly instituted, at a rate of 70.9%.152 
For all other grounds, decisions not to institute predominate by large 
margins: challenges based on novelty were denied at a rate of 59.3%; 
nonobviousness, 56.9%; enablement, 100%; written description, 
71.7%; and definiteness, 64.7%.153 
C. COURT DECISIONS 
While the USPTO evaluates and decides invalidity petitions, 
federal courts must decide how to manage ongoing patent 
infringement litigation on which these validity challenges can have 
considerable impact. The most frequent decision for courts is when 
to issue a stay. The ability of defendants to obtain litigation stays 
pending the outcome of validity challenges is a powerful strategic 
consideration in managing both the immediate cost of litigation and 
the eventual threat of liability. Conversely, the tendency of courts to 
grant such stays is a powerful strategic consideration for patent 
owners to enforce their rights effectively and deflect potential 
harassment and abuse by challengers. 
Table 1. Results of Motions to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review 










Motion to Stay Pending 
Inter Partes Review 
67 47 22 113 
 
 151. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 152. The difference between likelihoods of grant and denial is highly significant 
(p < 0.0001 using a two-tailed test of proportions). 
 153. The differences between likelihoods of grant and denial were all significant 
(p < 0.05) and in many cases highly significant (p < 0.005) using a two-tailed test of 
proportions. 
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Renewed Motion to 
Stay Pending Inter 
Partes Review 
2 0 2 11 
Stipulated/Agreed 
Motion to Stay Pending 
Inter Partes Review 
0 2 2 1 
Sua Sponte Motion to 
Stay Pending Inter 
Partes Review 
0 0 0 1 
Subtotal 69 49 26 126 
Share 25.6% 18.2% 9.63% 46.7% 
Table 2. Results of Motions to Stay Pending Covered Business Method 
Review 








Motion to Stay Pending 
CBM Review 
12 7 9 26 
Renewed Motion to 
Stay Pending CBM 
Review 
1 0 0 7 
Sua Sponte Motion to 
Stay Pending CBM 
Review 
0 0 0 1 
Subtotal 13 7 9 34 
Share 20.6% 11.1% 14.3% 54.0% 
Tables 1 and 2 provide basic statistics regarding motions for stays 
pending IPR and CBM proceedings, as well as federal court 
adjudications of such motions. As the statistics indicate, full denials 
of motions to stay (as contrasted to the combined total of “denials 
without prejudice,” partial grants, and grants) are relatively rare, 
particularly in the context of CBM reviews. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Our analysis yields several “top-line” findings regarding strategic 
choices by parties in PTAB proceedings. Most patents challenged at 
the PTAB are also in Article III litigation—PTAB petitions on patents 
that are not being litigated by any entity in an Article III court are 
relatively rare.  Moreover, the standard substitution model – wherein 
a petitioner files a patent challenge at the PTAB after it has been sued 
on that patent in district court is operative not only in the CBM 
context but also in the majority (70%) of PTAB IPR cases. The high 
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prevalence of standard substitution has clear implications for how 
the PTAB should conduct claim construction. In those cases where a 
patent claim is upheld by the PTAB, a claim construction standard 
that parallels that of the district court would increase efficiency, as 
the district court could rely on the PTAB claim construction in any 
subsequent proceedings.154  Our findings on substitution are thus 
directly relevant to the claim construction dispute currently being 
litigated at the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee. 
If there is no Article III litigation, CCM patents are particularly 
unlikely to be challenged at the PTAB. In this area of technology, 
district court assertion may be necessary to force parties to overcome 
several technology-specific barriers to a petition. These barriers may 
include an absence of clarity regarding the merits of a validity 
challenge created by lack of boundary notice, as well as informational 
hurdles created by the sheer volume of CCM patents. 
Just as Article III litigation disproportionately accompanies 
PTAB petitions on CCM patents, IPR petitions in the CCM field 
appear to be brought largely by the same entities that are defendants 
in Article III litigation. Both the share of CCM petitions involving at 
least one prior Article III defendant (81.5%) and the share of CCM 
petitioners who are themselves prior defendants (76.3%) are quite 
high. This result suggests that non-standard petitioners are, at least 
thus far, playing a relatively modest role in IPR petitions brought 
against CCM patents. Thus, to the extent we see a substantial amount 
of serial petitioning in the CCM area, this is being generated by prior 
defendants. 
The most significant role for non-standard petitioners is in the 
Drugs and Medical area. For Drugs and Medical-related challenges, 
previously sued defendants make up only a minority of petitioners 
(48.5%). Non-standard petitioners also appear to be engaging in 
 
 154. Indeed, if the claim construction standards used by the PTAB and the 
district court were the same, and the parties involved in the two fora were the same, 
the doctrine of issue preclusion might mandate district court reliance upon the 
prior PTAB claim construction. In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis, 135 S.Ct. 1293 
(2015), the Supreme Court recently held that issue preclusion applied when the 
same parties were litigating in district court a “likelihood of confusion” issue that 
had previously been decided at the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.  
Identical claim construction standards could also mean that if the district court 
had issued a claim construction prior to the PTAB, the PTAB could rely on the 
district court construction.  As a practical matter, however, because of the time that 
generally elapses before district court claim construction, and because PTAB claim 
construction occurs at the time of the institution decision, district court claim 
construction is unlikely to precede claim construction by the PTAB. 
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significant collective action with standard petitioners. A substantial 
majority (70.8%) of petitions in this area contains at least one 
petitioner who has previously been sued. Litigation defendants in the 
Drugs and Medical field are clearly bringing aboard entities that have 
not yet been sued. In order to address policy implications (e.g., 
whether it is socially beneficial collective action or possible 
harassment), we are currently investigating the important policy 
question of precisely when these other entities are getting on board.  
In addition to technology-specific effects, we see district-specific 
effects. To a statistically significant degree, patents litigated in the 
“top three” district courts—the Eastern District of Texas, the District 
of Delaware, and the Northern District of California—are more likely 
to be the subject of an IPR than patents litigated in other districts. 
The statistically and numerically significant results for the Eastern 
District of Texas are unsurprising. Whether or not judges in the 
Eastern District grant stays for ongoing litigation (and the available 
data suggest defendants are less likely to seek or be granted stays 
than in other districts), the Eastern District’s “pro-plaintiff” 
reputation makes filing a PTAB petition an obvious choice for any 
defendant. In the case of Delaware and the Northern District of 
California, the reasons for disproportionately high IPR filings are 
less clear. Defendants in those districts may be encouraged, however, 
by the high rate of stay grants in these districts. 
Agency decision-making also exhibits some interesting patterns. 
Perhaps because high early rates of institution spurred petitioners to 
challenge somewhat stronger patents, the overall institution rate has 
decreased over time. Agency decision-making also exhibits 
differential patterns across technology: specifically, IPR institution 
rates are significantly higher for CCM patents than for Drug and 
Medical patents. Meanwhile, nonobviousness represents a stronger 
ground for securing a favorable institution decision on an IPR than 
novelty. As for CBM reviews, § 101 is clearly the best route for 
challengers. 
In current ongoing work, we are investigating both more 
intensively and more formally the interrelated questions of collective 
action and potential harassment. Specifically, we are investigating 
the precise nature and timing of the collective action undertaken 
both by petitioners that are prior defendants and those that are not 
prior defendants. We are also interested in whether non-defendant 
petitioners do in fact become defendants at a later point in time. 
Additionally, we are developing regression models that assess, 
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conditional on assertion in litigation, what factors influence the 
likelihood and frequency of a patent being challenged at the PTAB. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our data indicate that PTAB petitions on patents that are not 
being litigated by any entity in an Article III court are relatively rare, 
particularly in the CCM area.  Additionally, the “standard model” of 
prior district court defendants bringing PTAB petitions on the 
patents asserted against them in district court explains 70% of IPR 
cases and an even greater percentage of CBM cases. 
Given the dominance of prior federal district court litigation 
involving the same parties in patents challenged through IPRs and 
CBMs, the PTAB’s approach to claim construction should be one 
upon which district courts can rely in subsequent proceedings. With 
identical standards, district courts will be able to reap significant 
efficiency gains from PTAB claim construction decisions.  
That said, a significant minority of IPRs are being brought by 
entities that were not prior defendants in lawsuits over the patents 
that they are now challenging.  Non-standard petitioners are 
particularly prevalent in the Drugs and Medical area.  In ongoing 
research, we are examining the precise role of these non-standard 
petitioners to examine whether they are engaging in beneficial 
collective action or in non-beneficial harassment.  
Finally, at least thus far, the relative reluctance of the Eastern 
District of Texas to grant stays does not appear to have impeded 
entities’ disproportionate desire to seek IPRs for patents asserted in 
the Eastern District. Perhaps more surprisingly, patents asserted in 
the Northern District of California and in the District of Delaware 
also see a disproportionate number of IPR petitions. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA 
Our analysis can be replicated using data from DocketNavigator, 
which provides free and low-cost access to coded metadata about 
patent cases in the U.S. federal courts and the USPTO Patent Trial 
and Appeal Board.155 In this Appendix, we describe the 
DocketNavigator data with the understanding that other researchers 
can readily access it to replicate our study. 
A. PTAB DATA 
DocketNavigator’s search interface allows minimal queries that 
can yield large result sets. Thus, to obtain all case information on all 
petitions filed in the PTAB, we used only one search term: “Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)” for the “Court/Agency” field. 
Because the total number of PTAB cases in the DocketNavigator 
database recently passed 4,000 and search results are displayed one 
hundred at a time, the results are distributed across forty pages. 
Detailed party information about cases is bulk-downloadable on a 
page-by-page basis, i.e., each download contains detailed party 
information about the cases displayed on the given page of results. 
Similarly, detailed information about the patents involved in the 
cases is bulk-downloadable on a page-by-page basis as well. Both sets 


















USPTO class codes 
Cooperative patent class 
codes 
Importantly, case-identifying variables appear in both sets of 
downloads, allowing them to be merged. To construct our data set, 
we downloaded this detailed party information as well as patent 
 
 155. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://www.docketnavigator.com [http://perma.cc/
QLY4-LJT7]. 
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information for all PTAB petitions and merged them by PTAB case 
number. The merged results yielded a comprehensive set of filing, 
party, and patent information for each IPR and CBM review petition 
at the PTAB. 
In addition to petition data, DocketNavigator provides searchable 
data on PTAB institution decisions. As the earliest PTAB institution 
decisions came in December 2012, a date-based search for decisions 
issued on or after November 1, 2012 (or any similarly early date), 
returns a set of all decisions. As with petition data, these results are 
accessible one hundred at a time on a page-by-page basis. To this 
end, the “Print Friendly” feature in the search result interface 
generates a simple formatted table to copy directly into spreadsheet 
software. The institution decision data contain the following 
variables: 




Substantive ground for petition 
Institution decision on that ground 
Relevant patent claims to which the decision pertains 
Order filing date 
Finally, DocketNavigator provides searchable data on final 
determinations by the PTAB. Searching for “Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board (PTAB)” in the “Court/Agency” field returns a set of all 
determinations. These results, too, are accessible one hundred at a 
time on a page-by-page basis and available in a simple formatted 
table through the “Print Friendly” feature in the search result 
interface. The final determinations data contain the following 
variables: 
Final Determination Information 
Patent number 
Case name 
Case filing date 
Determination 
Judge 
Order filing date 
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Because this institution decision data and final determination 
data also contain case-identifying variables that overlap with the 
filing, party, and patent data, we readily merged this additional 
information into our data set as well. 
B. DISTRICT COURT DATA 
We obtained case information on patent litigations filed in the 
U.S. district courts with a similarly minimal search query in 
DocketNavigator’s primary search interface: “U.S. District Courts 
(and all districts)” for the “Court/Agency” field. The total number of 
patent cases in the DocketNavigator database exceeded 55,000 
results. Because IPR petitions are generally time-barred one year 
from the date when a would-be petitioner has been sued on the same 
patent in U.S. district court,156 we determined that a reasonably 
complete set of federal patent litigation would not need to extend 
more than one year before the IPR mechanism became available. 
Therefore, we narrowed our search to cases, other than declaratory 
judgment cases, filed on or after September 16, 2011, one year prior 
to the enactment of IPR and CBM review mechanisms in the PTAB.  
As with PTAB cases, detailed party and patent information about 
U.S. district court patent cases is bulk-downloadable on a page-by-


















USPTO class codes 
Cooperative patent class codes 
To construct our data set, we downloaded this detailed party and 
patent information for all relevant patent lawsuits and merged them 
on the case number, producing a comprehensive set of filing, party, 
and patent information on each patent lawsuit in the U.S. district 
courts. 
 
 156. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES 
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Figure 4: Proportions of IPR Petitions Containing Each Grounds 








Anticipation (§102) 46.2% 58.3% 54.1% 49.0% 51.4% 61.6%
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Figure 8: Share of IPR-Challenged Patents in Each Technology Area  
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Figure 9: Number of IPR-Challenged Patents Across Technology Area,  
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Figure 12: Average Number of Federal-Court Assertion of  
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Figure 13: Technology Proportions Among PTAB-Only, Federal  








PTAB Only 12.5% 32.8% 20.6% 13.9% 11.5% 8.8%
USDC Only 4.9% 37.1% 19.7% 11.3% 10.1% 16.9%
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Figure 14a: Share of CBM Petitioners That Were Defendants in a  
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Figure 14b: Share of CBM Petitions in Which At Least One Petitioner 
Was a  




















RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2016  3:16 PM 
2016] STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 107 
 
 
Figure 15a: Share of IPR Petitioners That Were Defendants in a  
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Figure 15b: Share of IPR Petitions in Which At Least One Petitioner 
Was a  
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Figure 17: Distribution of Lag Between First IPR Petition and First 










RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2016  3:16 PM 
2016] STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 111 
 
 
Figure 18: Distribution of Lag Between First IPR Petition and Last 
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Figure 19: IPR Filings, Institution Decisions, and Institution 
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Figure 21: Rate of At-Least-Partial Institution and Full Institution of 
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Granted 48.4% 50.9% 40.1% 47.5% 52.0% 49.7%
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Granted 68.5% 54.9% 56.2% 58.6% 56.6% 58.0%
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Granted 70.9% 40.7% 43.1% 0.0% 28.3% 35.3%
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APPENDIX C: TABLES 
Table 1: Inter Partes petitions filed by Intel in the Zond cases 
Petition For IPR Number Filing Date 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00443 Feb. 20, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00444 Feb. 20, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00445 Feb. 20, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00446 Feb. 20, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00447 Feb. 20, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00455 Feb. 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00456 Feb. 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00468 Feb. 28, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00470 Mar. 7, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00473 Mar. 7, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00494 Mar. 13, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00495 Mar. 13, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00496 Mar. 13, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00497 Mar. 13, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00498 Mar. 13, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00520 Mar. 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00521 Mar. 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00522 Mar. 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00523 Mar. 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00598 Apr. 9, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00686 Apr. 24, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00765 May 16, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00820 May 27, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00843 May 29, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00913 Jun 6, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00923 Jun 10, 2014 
Intel Corporation IPR2014-00945 Jun 12, 2014 
  
RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/22/2016  3:16 PM 
2016] STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING 119 
Table 2: Inter Partes Review Petitions filed by Defendants in Zond 
cases 
Petition For IPR Number Filing Date 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. IPR2014-01037 June 30, 2014 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. IPR2014-01075 June 30, 2014 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. IPR2014-01071 June 30, 2014 
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. IPR2014-01069 June 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited IPR2014-00848 May 29, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00850 May 29, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00844 May 29, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00846 May 29, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00845 May 29, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00849 May 29, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00855 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00866 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00851 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00865 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00856 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00859 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00858 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00863 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00864 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00867 May 30, 2014 
Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd. IPR2014-00918 June 09, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01042 June 27, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01059 June 27, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01047 June 27, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01083 June 30, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01086 June 30, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01076 June 30, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01061 June 30, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01087 June 30, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01073 June 30, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01088 July 01, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01098 July 01, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01099 July 01, 2014 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01089 July 01, 2014 
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Petition For IPR Number Filing Date 
GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc. IPR2014-01100 July 01, 2014 
Renesas Electronics Corp. IPR2014-01057 June 27, 2014 
Renesas Electronics Corp. IPR2014-01046 June 27, 2014 
Renesas Electronics Corp. IPR2014-01066 June 30, 2014 
Renesas Electronics Corp. IPR2014-01063 June 30, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00805 May 23, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00782 May 19, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00781 May 19, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00800 May 22, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00799 May 22, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00803 May 22, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00802 May 22, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00807 May 23, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00808 May 23, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00819 May 27, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00821 May 27, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00818 May 27, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00828 May 28, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00829 May 28, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00827 May 28, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00861 May 30, 2014 
Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co. IPR2014-00917 June 09, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00479 Mar. 4, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00477 Mar. 4, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00974 June 18, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00975 June 18, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00972 June 18, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00973 June 18, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00992 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00986 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00981 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00991 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00984 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00990 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00988 June 19, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00985 June 19, 2014 
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Petition For IPR Number Filing Date 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01003 June 20, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00996 June 20, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01000 June 20, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-00995 June 20, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01004 June 20, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01012 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01017 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01016 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01015 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01019 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01014 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01013 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01020 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01022 June 23, 2014 
The Gillette Co. IPR2014-01025 June 23, 2014 
Toshiba Corp. IPR2014-01072 June 30, 2014 
Toshiba Corp. IPR2014-01070 June 23, 2014 
Toshiba Corp. IPR2014-01067 June 23, 2014 
Toshiba Corp. IPR2014-01074 June 23, 2014 
Toshiba Corp. IPR2014-01065 June 23, 2014 
 
Table 3: Inter Partes Review Petitions filed by Defedants in E-Watch 
v. LG Electronics 
Petition For IPR Number Filing Date 
HTC Corp. IPR2014-00987 June 19, 2014 
Sony Mobile Comm. (USA) Inc. IPR2015-00402 Dec. 10, 2014 
LG Electronics, Inc. IPR2015-00404 Dec. 10, 2014 
Kyocera Communications, Inc. IPR2015-00406 Dec. 10, 2014 
Apple Inc. IPR2015-00411 Dec. 11, 2014 
Apple Inc. IPR2015-00412 Dec. 11, 2014 
Apple Inc. IPR2015-00413 Dec. 11, 2014 
Samsung Electronics Co. IPR2015-00541 Jan. 7, 2015 
Samsung Electronics Co. IPR2015-00610 Jan. 23, 2015 
Samsung Electronics Co. IPR2015-00612 Jan. 23, 2015 
ZTE (USA) Inc. IPR2015-01366 June 09, 2015 
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